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Internet of +ings (IoT) devices may transfer data to the gateway/application server through File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
transaction. Unfortunately, in terms of security, the FTP server at a gateway or data sink very often is improperly set up. At the
same time, password matching/theft holding is among the popular attacks as the intruders attack the IoT network. +us, this
paper attempts to provide an insight of this type of attack with the main aim of coming up with attack patterns that may help the
IoT system administrator to analyze any similar attacks. +is paper investigates brute force attack (BFA) on the FTP server of
the IoT network by using a time-sensitive statistical relationship approach and visualizing the attack patterns that identify its
configurations. +e investigation focuses on attacks launched from the internal network, due to the assumption that the IoT
network has already installed a firewall. An insider/internal attack launched from an internal network endangers more the
entire IoT security system. +e experiments use the IoT network testbed that mimic the internal attack scenario with three
major goals: (i) to provide a topological description on how an insider attack occurs; (ii) to achieve attack pattern extraction
from raw sniffed data; and (iii) to establish attack pattern identification as a parameter to visualize real-time attacks. Ex-
perimental results validate the investigation.
1. Introduction
Earlier security protocols should be pertinent to IoT to
assure basic security services including authentication,
confidentiality, integrity, nonrepudiation, access control,
and availability. +e reason is that IoT is as an extension of
the classical Internet framework and technology. Never-
theless, the IoTnetwork is constrained by several new factors
such as huge numbers of devices and objects that may in-
teract together in a complex manner, using different security
techniques. Moreover, the evolution from limited access and
closed networks to open ones increased the requirement for
security alerts to protect all the devices in an IoT network
from intrusions [1].
End nodes (sensors/devices) are attached to IoT net-
works and communicate with a data/application server
through a gateway. Collected data are usually transmitted
from the gateway to a data/application server using the FTP
protocol. Unfortunately, in terms of security, the FTP server
at a gateway or data sink very often is improperly set up. At
the same time, password matching/theft holding is among
the popular attacks as the intruders attack the IoT network.
+e novelty of this paper is the use of a time-sensitive
statistical relationship approach and visualizing the attack
patterns that identify its configurations in brute force attack
(BFA) on an FTP service investigation. +e investigation
focuses on attacks launched from the internal network, due
to the assumption that the IoTnetwork has already installed
a firewall. +e investigation provides a new insight of this
type of attack with the main aim of coming up with attack
patterns visualization that may help the IoT system ad-
ministrator to analyze easily any similar attacks.
An insider/internal attack launched from an internal
network endangers more the entire IoT security system.
+us, securing FTP connections from botnet attacks on IoT
networks is crucial. To understand how to protect against
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such attacks, it is best to examine the attack from the at-
tacker’s perspective with regard to the used methods, desired
goals, and the manner of launching the attacks. +e authors
undertake experiments to investigate several attack types, in
particular in intrusions such as (i) probes that aim to obtain
detailed information and (ii) brute force attacks (BFA)
geared towards guessing passwords and/or gaining privi-
leged access.
Several malware variants, as discussed by [2, 3], infect
hardware, software, and networks and, in some cases, can
also infiltrate via spam, phishing, and drive-by download.
+is paper describes brute force malware attacks on the
FTP server of an IoT network to gain escalating privileged
access in the IoT environment. Steiner [4] identified
weaknesses in FTP service provision and strengthened by the
results of research in [5]. Meanwhile, Joshi et al. [6] clearly
described a BFA to break FTP’s encrypted password.
Nevertheless, FTP remains a major alternative for the
provision of data transfer services despite its vulnerability,
due to the use of plain text authentication procedure.
Having done experiments and investigation, the authors
describe the following relevant matters:
(i) How to extract important features of data packages
related to potential attack packages
(ii) How to detect BFAs on FTP services on IoT
networks
(iii) How to visualize FTP attacks by using a time-
sensitive statistical relationship
(iv) How to display patterns of known attacks by
computing the number of alerts.
+e paper is divided and arranged as follows: Section 2
discusses literature review of related works. +e research
methodology is in Section 3 that consists of the scenario, the
stages, and the groove in the investigation including scan-
ning, brute force, and gaining privileges are considered.
Presentations and discussions of the results are described in
Section 4. Section 5 provides a conclusion.
2. Related Works
Previous researches [7, 8] have tested the penetration of
Internet service operating systems to analyze vulnerability
and exploitable security lapses. +eir results can be sum-
marized as follows: (i) an advanced system is affected by
many factors including its kernel engine, active services,
degree of expired service engines, and time period for up-
dates; (ii) each attack contains a unique payload that serves
as a flag attack pattern; and (iii) all operating systems tested
(FreeBSD, Linux, and Windows servers) have levels of
vulnerability and were given risk ratings. Similar researches
are also being carried out by Austin et al. [9], and Broucek
and Turner [10] undertook similar investigations in prep-
aration for an offensive cyberwar.
Currently, three methods are commonly used to elicit
passwords: brute force, dictionary, and Hybrid attacks. +e
present work examines BFAs that are used to find the
combination of password to access FTP services. BFA
purposes are to break/decrypt secret codes by trying all
possible keystrokes for which the probability of success is
highly dependent on the level of difficulty for the password
combination.
Venter’s benchmark works [11, 12] presented possibil-
ities for breaking password codes both offline and online and
have been referred to by many researchers. +e researches
present about some possibilities which can be done to break
the password in both ways: offline and online. Moreover,
Helkala et al. [13] reinforced Venter’s research by using
small instruments that yielded high impacts. In addition,
Pilli et al. [14] and Vykopal [15] described other aspects of
BFAs regarding taxonomy, multiple approaches, and
distributions.
In essence, BFAs force the inclusion of characters that
hazard guesses password and can be done remotely by an
attacker machine. In brief, BFA is a password experiment
that uses a mix of possible ASCII characters in isolation or in
combinations.
Generally, BFAs are divided into two attack classes,
insider or outsider, as reported by [3, 16, 17]. Both of these
attacks are illustrated in Figure 1. Meanwhile, online
password hacking has been described in [18], and offline
hacking research has demonstrated that a number of
characters and password combinations greatly influence the
length of time required for hacking [13, 15]. Overall, all cited
investigators stressed that BFAs have real-time capability to
actually deduce valid passwords on FTP servers.
According to Jang-Jaccard and Nepal [3] and Nithiya-
nandam et al. [19], several types of potential internal/insider
attacks are possible. +ese include the man in the middle
attack, bring your own device (BYOD) attack, malware,
device/physical data theft, and sabotage. +e observations
allowed to characterize and conclude the following:
(a) +e insider attack is usually perceived as a valid user
of the institution/company
(b) +e insider attack has limited access to some services
without additional coatings on different service
packages and also differs from inbound packages
from outside the network that are tightly scrutinized
by filters with multiple DMZ services
(c) An insider attack on IoT is a multiform that poses
various problems related to malicious and accidental
security incidents stemming from employees and
outsources
(d) Since the attacker is inside, they have detailed
knowledge of technical matters such as the network’s
backbone, IP address allocations, the virtual local
area network (VLAN), the service clustering appli-
cation, and IT staff members who monitor the
network
Figure 2 demonstrates brute force attack approaches
and methods and visualize patterns that describe brute
force attacks. Some attack patterns were produced by
using graphinfo’s time-sensitive approach to statistical re-
lationships, as discussed by Saoddodin and Ghorbani [20].
Other patterns were generated and simulated with the MIT
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DARPA dataset. Distribution values for pattern outcomes
obtained during simulated attacks matched results from
extracted package data.
Attack detection tools are alternately used by many
researchers including Snort detection software, which has a
detection engine that produces alerts [21–24]. Its ability
expressly relies on available rules (in/etc/snort/rules/) that
effectively recognize attacks. Snort also compiles a pcap file
of raw data derived from its sniffing process. Both abilities
have made Snort a major tool and referenced instrument in
the field of systems security researches.
+e Snort engine is also used to report “front-end” at-
tacks. Its engine identifies malicious attempts during real-

































































































































Figure 2: (a) Brute force attacks. (b) Attack pattern based on the correlation approach.
Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering 3
malicious activity occurs, Snort generates hundreds of events
to warn that an activity has been identified as a potential
threat. Snort also uses a variety of methods that categorize
and log intrusions. Best of all, Snort alerts contain copious
data such as IP addresses that identify source-destination,
port addresses (source and destination), attack names, alert
priority, TTL, and packet length. Snort Version 2.8.5 (Build
121) uses 65 rules that identify and detect threats from pcap
files and then used to produce numerous alerts in the log
directory (“/var/log/snort”). +e number of rows generated
during reiterative runs of the same data is simplified by
initialization based on signature-id and priority. Each alert
consists of a signature-id, priority, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip,
dst_port, timestamp, TTL, ToS, IP_Len, and Dgm_Len.
Total proceeds of the acquired alert information are then
compared to verify all packets as “successfully identified”
and “responded-to” for each penetration scenario.
Figure 3 shows the general architecture of Snort’s three
main modules: (i) preprocessor; (ii) detection engine; (iii)
alert. A package that is successfully captured by the sniffer
module is converted to the pcap library. +e preprocessor
sorts the content that is then classified into several categories
for compilation in the Snort engine using available rules.
+ese rules critically affect the attack’s suggested outcome.
On the contrary, researchers have proposed a modification
mechanism to update and thus optimize rule capabilities
[22, 25].
3. Investigation Method
+e investigation uses a small-scale IoT network testbed
consisting of multiple hardware including the DHT22
sensor, MQ2 sensor, soil moisture sensor, water level
sensor, two Zigbee type sensors, and WeMos D1 micro-
controller equipped with the ESP8266 Wi-Fi module. Two
middleware modules using Raspberry Pi microcontroller
are used for communicating the Zigbee and Wi-Fi types of
equipment. In addition, the testbed utilizes supporting
software such as MySQL database, DoS tools Hping3,
Apache Web Server, and Snort as IDS. Figure 4 illustrates
the topology of the testbed. Table 1 shows short de-
scriptions of the equipment.
Figure 5 depicts the overall process flow of the packet
capturing and decoding in the experiments. Figure 5(a)
depicts the capturing work flow. Figure 5(b) shows the
process of raw data extraction to obtain unique features after
data processing and training. +is process is necessary to
extract parameters required to search for and identify
common ground patterns of a BFA. When running a BFA
scenario, the pcap file activates the sniffing process and
produces raw data that is not humanly readable due to the
unique structure of the IPv4 header, which has hidden layers
that depend on protocols and sundry encapsulation pro-
cesses. To facilitate the process of training, file types that can
be processed and generally accepted are required. Here, a
“csv” file type is used as the result of raw data processing. A
search process for the same pattern comprises raw data
derived from a harsher algorithm that classifies certain
values in a field of interest. Figure 5(b) presents the algo-
rithm’s flowchart. Having finished the features extraction
process, solid parameters are generated to benchmark the
attack archetype.
3.1. Phases. For the purpose of simulating the insider attack
by two attacker hosts that targeted a main services server,
six arrangements and assumptions to the attack stages are
set up:
(1) To distinguish normal traffic from attack traffic, the
attacks are divided into several time-based stages,
and both targeted machines and attack method are
identified.
(2) Host machine bearing IP address 192.168.10.2 is the
network-monitoring server as well as FTP server and
able to capture traffic and has the visualization
module.
(3) TCPdump directly records all network traffic using
the libpcap library to capture packets. It also serves as
a packet sniffer. TCPdump produces raw data (pcap









Figure 3: General architecture of Snort.
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file) during experiments through the all sniffer
nodes.
(4) IDS Snort 2.8.5.2 (Build 121) PCRE ver. 8.12 is run
on user machine 192.168.10.10. Snort identifies
threat patterns and provides real-time attack alerts.
+e Snort captures all traffic for comparison with
signatures database.
(5) Attacks are launched by machines 192.168.10.11,
192.168.10.30 (Wi-Fi Hackers) and are running
Windows 8, andmachine connects through the XBee
protocol (XBee Hacker).
(6) Targeted host is a server running Windows Server
2003 (IP address 192.168.10.2) and multiple appli-
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Figure 4: Testbed topology.
Table 1: List of equipment for the testbed.
Name IP address Description
Node 1 192.178.10.3 DHT22 sensor
Node 2 192.178.10.4 Soil moisture sensor
Node 3 192.178.10.5 MQ2 sensor
Node 4 192.178.10.6 Water level sensor
Node 5 Pan-ID: 2017 Zigbee sensor
Node 6 Pan-ID: 2018 Zigbee sensor
Middleware 1 192.178.10.7 Raspberry Pi
Middleware 1 192.178.10.8 Raspberry Pi
User 192.168.10.10 Laptop as sniffer
Attacker 192.168.10.11 Laptop as sniffer (using Wi-Fi)
Attacker 192.168.10.30 Laptop as sniffer (using Wi-Fi)
Server 192.168.10.2 Monitoring and FTP server, as well as sniffer
XBee attacker — Laptop (using XBee)
Router — Wireless router
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3.2. Internal Attack Activity. +e following are the detailed
activities for the attack investigation:
(1) +e attack machine 192.168.10.11 scans the local
network 192.168.10.0 using Nmap
(2) +e attack machine 192.168.10.11 scans the local
network 192.168.10.0 using Nikto
(3) +e attack machine 192.168.10.11 scans “FIN” to
the local network 192.168.10.0 using Zenmap
(4) +e attack machine 192.168.10.11 scans the local
network 192.168.10.0 using HTTPrint
(5) Attacker probes the network 192.168.10.0 via attack
machine 192.168.10.11 using Nessus
(6) Attacker probes the network 192.168.10.0 via attack
machine 192.168.10.30 using GFI LanGuard
(7) Attacker probes the network 192.168.10.0 via attack
machine 192.168.10.30 using Nsteatlth HTTP
(8) Attacker probes open port of the server machine
192.168.10.2 via attack machine 192.168.10.30 using
Netools
(9) Attacker finds an open port for potential pene-
tration: 21 (FTP), 22 (SSH), 80 (HTTP), 111
(RPCbin), and 3306 (MySQL)
(10) Attackers attempt XSS via HTTP port 80
(11) Attackers guess the password by the FTP brute
force attempt
(12) Attackers try to login the host by WinSCP Software
(13) Attackers upload Trojan, copies the file to the host
(14) Attackers create/mkdir “tools” in the host by
WinSCP
(15) Attackers login to the server machine 192.168.10.2
via Putty software
(16) Attackers login to the server via user: ant
(17) Attackers try to activate the backdoor through
executing Trojan malware
(18) Attackers run command “#sudo cat/etc/shadow”
(19) Attackers browse directory “administrator” and
“ant”
(20) Attackers two times login using “su” to try esca-
lating privilege
(21) Attackers try to find the directory password via
“#sudo/etc/passwd”
(22) Attackers attempt to ARP Poison via Cain&Abel
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Figure 5: (a) Flowchart of packet capturing preparation; (b) flowchart of packet decoding.
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(24) Attackers attempt to send TCP SYN via Trinoo
(25) Attackers flooding traffic to the server machine
192.168.10.2 via UDP.
+e success of the experiment relies on proving the
existence of the unique attack pattern scenarios by (i)
comparing attack timelines, (ii) capturing packages by the
sniffer, and (iii) retrieving data log results from the targeted
machine. +is completed set of data is combined to prove
whether the observed pattern matched the BFA profile or
any other attack types. +e authors combined all three
datasets with raw data compiled by the Snort engine to
certify the correctly identified attack, as recognized by the
Snort signature database. Results were reiteratively vali-
dated by the time line as well as by reviewing sundry in-
formation derived by the Snort alert. Hence, correct attack
scenario results on the targeted machine were robustly
demonstrated.
+e observations will reveal a looping pattern in a
single line of data packets at a certain point in time with the
same value in the same field. Figure 6 shows a simplified
process for sorting the data as a single plot that visualized
captured alert results that were identified as an attack.
Figure 7 demonstrates performance stages in attack
identification as an online display that is spelled out by the
pseudocode.
4. Experimental Results
+is section presents investigation results in stages. Having
completed the process of traffic sniffing on the network to
produce raw data, the captured data are then extracted and
read to determine the pattern for each attack model. In this
case, both BFA pattern and normal FTP pattern were focal
observations. Figure 8 depicts an example of the extracted
data indicating that raw data hold unique reiterated fields
that revealed an ongoing process. Fields of the extracted
payload are timestamp, packet size, total packet length,
protocol flags, windowing, protocol length, content, and
signature. Figure 8 shows the traffic data with time stamp
values: 12475, 12476, and 12477 are repeating. +e alerts are
displayed on an integrated dashboard, as depicted in Fig-
ure 9. +e detection system displays any attack reports that
originated from Snort alerts and then visualizes them in an
online manner. +is application produces values by sorting
and filtering fields of traffic packets that are previously
analyzed by the sniffing process.
At a separate process, Snort concurrently generates
groups of alerts recognized as patterns that matched the
database signature. Figure 10 shows some of these alerts,
which were vigorously determined by employing “rules
engines” of Snort. Each rule has a unique pattern that is
recognized as an attack; however, due to a major problem in
the Snort detection system—high false alarms that affect
matrices values for false positives (FP), false negatives (FN),
true positives (TP), and true negatives (TN)—Snort cannot
serve as a primary reference. Nevertheless, Snort is the
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Figure 6: Flowchart of the sorting process.
Figure 7: Pseudocode for performing stages in identifying the
attacks procedure.
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Figures 11 and 12 show attack patterns after insider
brute force attacks happened on the FTP server.
Figure 11(a) displays the frequency of attack when it
happened (from 21.05 to 21.10 hours). +e attacker uses
two techniques: brute force and dictionary. Figures 11(b)
and 11(c) show the number of attacks per-second for
brute force attack and dictionary attack, respectively.
Both types show similar pattern that explain the attacks
have same main characteristics. During the “FTP SITE
EXEC attempt” attack—included in the remote to local
(R2L)—the attacker can perform the command “SITE
EXEC” on the targeted machine by providing the path
name using certain characteristics. In other words, a
remote attacker can execute commands on the FTP
server, including the creation of certain directories.
Consequently, this attack allows the attacker to gain root-
level access to the system.
Figure 12 shows the traffic from one node to another
during the BFA happens. Both FTP SITE EXEC command
and FTP parameters were malformed and hence identified
by the “pattern of attack” rules identification procedure. +e
red line indicates a successful attack. +us, the IoT system
administrator visually is able to spot something wrong is
happening on the IoT network.
Figure 13 shows a characteristic/pattern of a change
working directory (CWD) attack where the attack is in-
cluded in R2L. R2L focuses on successful anonymous logins
that access the right to write in the system and plant
backdoor or other malware. Here, the attacker repeatedly
assaults the system with a pattern that differs from previous
attacks. +e pattern reflects several CWD stages. Having
successfully entered anonymously, the attacker attempts to
change the directory, which is preceded by a passive mode
command (PASV) that enables responsive communication.
+e attacker then follows with a Network Services Lead
Team (NLST) to restore files to a specified directory.
Figure 13 also displays traffic during BFA scenario testing,
scanning Denial-of-Service (DOS) flooding of the target.
+e traffic information in Figure 13 clearly illustrates of-
fensive package flow from the attacker to the targeted
machine.
Information inside the box A of Figure 13 indicates
alert from Snort that is displayed in the form of in-
formation on suspected attacks. +is information is to be
compared with proof that attacks occurred from the
detection procedure. Information inside the box B of
Figure 13 shows extraction results from the raw data
using the identification procedure in Figure 7. Both in-
formation shows similar attack characteristic/pattern
that generated alerts along with unique field values
that repeated in a single attack scenario. Hence, it is clear
that the simulated BFA scenario has generated a unique
characteristic/pattern. +is conclusion was confirmed
by Snort alert results. +us, the pattern identification
procedure shown in Figure 7 works well in detecting the
BFA.
Figure 8: Features extraction.
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5. Conclusion and Future Works
+is paper investigated brute force attack that attempts to
gain escalating privileges on an FTP server of the IoT net-
work.+e attack likely occurs due to weaknesses in the FTP’s
service that lacks encryption at a moment when running the
process of a three-way handshake. Moreover, attacks can
originate within the network and potentially occur because
an extensive upholstery system was improperly set up to
limit local user access, which, in turn, affects the entire
security of the system.
Experimental observations recognized BFA patterns
on an FTP service that matched the Snort analysis of cap-
tured data. Snort provides information to the system
administrator in the form of a warning alert to report
network occurrences. Findings from the experiments pro-
vide some visual protection assistance for researchers and
practitioners. +e authors intend to investigate IoT attack
patterns with more complicated network topologies and
scenarios, specifically, those launched by botnets on the IoT
network. Finally, Table 2 summarizes the findings from the
experiments.
Table 2 shows the patterns (features) used as signature
in the identification procedure of Figure 7 accurately
characterizing the attacks, and thus, the attack is suc-
cessfully detected. +is result was confirmed by Snort that
also produces an alert on the detection. +erefore, this
















2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. SNMP request udp 
2. (spp_ssh) Protocol mismatch 
3. (portscan) TCP Distributed Portscan 
4. (snort_decoder): Experimental Tcp
Options found 
5. ICMP Destination Unreachable
Communication Administratively Prohibited 
6. (portscan) Open Port 
7. COMMUNITY MISC BAD-SSL tcp detect 
8. (portscan) TCP Portscan 
9. COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP message flooding
directed to SIP proxy
10. ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication
with Destination Host is Administratively Prohibited 
11. (snortdecoder) WARNING: ICMP
Figure 9: Snort alert snapshot.
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Figure 12: Snapshot of the node-to-node traffics during the attack.
Figure 13: Confirmation of alert on attack by the detection algorithm (A) and by Snort (B).
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used for analyzing the attack works well. Visualization
assists the network administrator to identify any
anomalies/attacks easily.
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ac.id.
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